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DUPLICATE ORIGINALS AND THE
BEST EVIDENCE RULE
Chrhmer v Chrismer,
103 Ohio A1pp. 23, 144 N.E.2d 494 (1956)
The plaintiffs were the payees of a promissory note executed by
the defendant-maker. The maker requested that two identical notes be
made, and this was done with the aid of carbon paper. The maker took
the original and the payees retained the carbon copy. As the executor
of the defendant-maker's estate was unable to produce the original note,
the plaintiffs were allowed to introduce their copy into evidence without
accounting for. the original. The defendant objected on the grounds
that the plaintiffs failed to lay a proper foundation for the introduction
of their copy as the best evidence. The appellate court affirmed the trial
court's decision that the carbon was secondary evidence and therefore
not properly introduced.'
The Chrismer case is one of first impression in Ohio.' The real
issue in this case was whether under the best evidence rule the carbon-
made note could be regarded as primary evidence of the transaction
between the parties. Although there is some disagreement as to the
application of the best evidence rule,' most modem writers adopt the
view that it is shorthand for the rule requiring the production of the
original document.4  Historically, the original document rule was
1 Chrismer v. Chrismer, 103 Ohio App. 23, 144 N.E.2d 494 (1956), reversed
and remanded for new trial. Although the appellant court agreed the note was
secondary evidence, the court held prejudicial error was committed by rejecting
the note upon the final submission of the case to the court.
2 The court in this case held that a carbon copy of a promissory note is not
a negotiable instrument. OHIo Ray. CoDE §1301.03 (1953). This Note will not
discuss the question of negotiability as this does not bear upon the operation of
the best evidence rule. International Harvester Co. v. Elfstrom, 101 Minn. 263,
112 N.W. 252 (1907). ,A copy of a promissory note was held to be secondary
evidence in Struam v. Klaurens, 140 Neb. 830, 2 N.W.2d 319 (1942); Brown
v. Van Tuyl, 40 Wash. 2d 364, 242 P.2d 1021 (1952). It should be noted that the
issue of negotiability was not directly before the court since the action was
between the parties to the original agreement. Wurlitzer Co. v. Dickinson, 247
I1. 27, 93 N.E. 132 (1910).
3The term "best evidence" first appeared in the case of Ford v. Hopkins,
1 Salk 283, 91 Eng. Rep. 250 (1699). This phrase was subsequently applied by
some of the earlier writers starting with Lord Gilbert in 1726 to mean the
"utmost proof the nature of the case is susceptible." For an historical development
see 4 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §1173 (3d ed. 1940). Some of our courts have followed
this application e.g., Gay v. United States, 118 F.2d 160 (7th Cir. 1941) ; Pettit v.
Campbell, 149 S.W.2d 633 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941).
4Michigan Banker's Ass'n. v. Ocean Acc. & Guarantee Corp, 274
Mich. 470, 264 N.W.868 (1936). THAYER, PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE
489 (1898) stated: "Indeed it (best evidence) would probably have dropped
naturally out of use long ago, if it had not come to be a convenient, short descrip-
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developed to protect against inaccuracy and fraud in proving the terms
of a particular writing5
In the majority of cases it is not difficult to determine which terms
are the ones to be proved, or to distinguish the original writing from
other evidence of the terms. More difficult are the cases where it is
contended that duplicate originals were executed. The courts have
recognized that "duplicate originals" have the same evidentiary status as
an original writing.'
The "duplicate" in legal conception is an original instrument re-
peated.7 This is illustrated in the cases where a carbon impression is
simultaneously produced by the same stroke that creates the original.
In that instance the legal act embraces all the writings and the courts
have received each writing as the original.'
A duplicate original, exists when the parties intend the writing to
have such effect. Frequently the courts become so concerned with the
operational mechanics that they fail to consider the effect the parties
gave to the particular writing. This is particularly evident in the cases
dealing with photostats and photographs.' Fundamentally, the courts
should first look to see if the parties wanted a writing to be an original.
The rule is designed to protect the parties and they should be able to
control its application regardless of the wisdom of their own act.
Some courts have looked for an express intent. to have carbon
copies function as an original.1" Many of the courts however receive
carbons as duplicate originals unless there appears to be an express intent
to the contrary." In the present case the plaintiffs' evidence tended to
show the maker expressly stated he wanted two notes representing his
indebtedness. Since it appears that both writings were intended to repre-
tion of the rule as to proving the contents of a writing." 4 WIGMooi, EVIDENCE
§1174; 1 JONEs, EVIDENCE §§199-200 (4th ed. 1998); Note, The Best Evidence
Rule-A Criticism, 3 NEWARK L. REv. 200 (1938).
5 For a complete historical development see 4 WiwMoRE, EVIDENCE §§1177-
1179; 1 JONEs, EVIDENCE §199.
6 4 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §1234; McCo.mIcK, EVIDENCE §206 (Hornbook 1954);
1 JONEs, EVIDENCE §209.
7 Schroer v. Schroer, 248 S.W.2d 617 (S.Ct. Mo. 1952).
8 Wurlitzer Co. v. Dickinson, supra note 2; Oberlin v. Pyle, 114 Ind. App. 21,
49 N.E.2d 970 (1943); Gus Dattilo Fruit Co. v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 238 Ky.
322, 37 S.V.2d 856 (1931) ; International Harvester Co. v. Elfstrom, supra note 2,
Annot., 51 A.L.R. 1498 (1927); see also supra note 6.
9 See infra note 26.
10 Tampa Shipbuilding & E. Co. v. General Construction Co., 43 F.2d 309
311 (5th Cir. 1930) stated: "Duplicates exist only when two instruments have both
been recognized and established by the parties concerned as evidence of their act."
Lockwood v. L. L. Freight Lines, 126 Fla. 474, 171 So. 236 (1936). Mauritz v.
Schwind, 101 S.W.2d 1085 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937); MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE §206.
11 "A growing number of courts today treat all carbons, when authenti-
cated as true reproductions, as if they were duplicate originals .... " MCCORMICK,
EVIDENCE §206, at 420; 1 JONEs, EVIDENCE §209; see supra note 8.
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sent the transaction, the plaintiffs' carbon should have been admitted as
a duplicate original.
The cases indicate that the duplicate original doctrine is not gov-
erned solely by the intent of the parties. The courts also look to the time
and manner in which the writings are brought into existence. The usual
approach in evaluating a writing as either an original or a copy is to
determine whether the writing was created simultaneously with the
original.
Today mechanical reproductions are mainly done by use of carbons.
One of the most frequently cited cases for the application of the dupli-
cate original doctrine to carbon copies is International Harvester v.
Elfstrom.2 The court in reference to the admission of a carbon copy
without accounting for the original said:
If the reproduction is complete there is no practical reason
why all the products of the single act of writing the contract
and aflixing a signature thereto should not be regarded as of
equal value. In this instance the same stroke produced both
signatures.
13
The Ohio court did not accept the reasoning of the International
Harvester case. Not all of the courts have accepted this view with re-
spect to carbon copies. 4 Nevertheless, many jurisdictions have ttpplied
the duplicate original doctrine to carbon-made writings such as letters,' 5
sales slips,16 reports,' 7 assignments,' 8 bills of lading, 9 deposit slips,2"
contracts,2 ' leases, 2 and other types of written documents. 23
12 Supra note 2.
13 Id. at 264, 112 N.W. at 253.
14 See cases collected in 1 JoNas, EVIDENCE §209; 20 AM. JUR., EvJidence
§390 (1939).
l General Life Ins. Co. v. Carter, 52 N.E.2d 509 (Ind. App. 1944) rev'd on
other grounds, 222 Ind. 557, 54 N.E.2d 944 (1944) ; Liberty Nat'l Bank & Trust Co.,
v. Louisville Trust Co., 295 Ky. 825, 175 S.W.2d 524 (1943); Hay v. Am. Fire
Clay Co., 179 Mo. App. 567, 162 S.W. 666 (1913) ; for cases contra see supra
note 10.
16 Douglas v. Parker Commercial Co., 28 Ariz. 47, 235 Pac. 148 (1925);
Spottiswood v. Weir, 66 Cal. 525, 6 Pac. 381 (1885); Morrow v. State, 190 Md.
559, 59 A.2d 325 (1948); Wurlitzer Co. v. Dickinson, supra note 2; State v.
Albertalli 78 NJ.L. 90, 73 At]. 128 (1909).
17 Gus Dattilo Fruit Co. v. Louisville, supra note 8; Oberlin v. Pyle, supra
note 8; State v. Stockton, 38 Tenn. App. 90, 270 S.W.2d 586 (1954).
18 Carter v. Carl Merveldt & Sons, 183 Okla. 152, 80 P.2d 254 (1938);
Maston v. Glen Lumber Co., 65 Okla. 80, 163 Pac. 128 (1917).
19 Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Gibson, 294 Ky. 55, 170 S.W.2d 907 (1943);
Walker v. So. R. Co., 76 S.C. 308, 56 S.E. 952 (1907).
20 Schroer v. Schroer, supra note 7.
21 International Harvester Co. v. Elfstrom, supra note 2; Stern Equipment
Co., Inc. v. Portell, 116 A.2d 601 (D.C.Mun. App. 1955) ; Quinn v. Standard Oil
Co., 249 Mass. 194, 144 N.E. 53 (1924) ; Parodi v. Universal Ins. Co., 128 N.J.L.
433, 26 A.2d 557 (1942).
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The courts have almost consistently held that those writings created
subsequent to the original are merely secondary evidence of the terms.
Thus letter press copies, 4 hand-copies,2" and photostats and photo-
graphs26 have been held inadmissible if the original is available and can
be produced. This indicates that an arbitrary time line has been drawn
to separate the originals from the copies.
The courts in applying the duplicate original doctrine have failed
to define adequately the term "original." If "original" includes only
those writings the parties intend to be originals, then the reliability of the
reproduced writing is important only as an element in proving intent.
Thus a photograph could not be primary evidence if the parties did not
intend it to be an original. If "original" includes those writings which
are as accurate as the original then the reliability of the reproduced
writing is of utmost importance. With this approach, a photostat upon
proper authentication might well be received as primary evidence of the
terms of a writing.
The application of the best evidence rule is further, complicated
by the term "best evidence." This term is misleading because it does
not necessarily refer to the most convincing evidence capable of being
produced." The fact that "best evidence" has been superimposed upon
the original document rule has resulted in some courts excluding reliable
reproductions because they were not the best possible evidence available.
This is illustrated by several of the cases refusing admission to photostats
or photographs. 28
22 Carroll v. Peake, 1 Pet. 18 (1828); Peaks v. Cobb, 192 Mass. 196, 77
N.E. 881 (1906).
23 Robinson v. State, 38 Ala. App. 315, 82 So. 2d 815 (1955) (a signed con-
fession) ; Campbell v. Pure Oil Co., 92 Ga. App. 523, 88 S.E.2d 630 (1955) (notice
of discharge) ; for further cases see Annot. 51 A.L.R. 1498 (1927).
24 Nodin v. Murray, 3 Camp. 228, 170 Eng. Rep. 1363 (1812) ; Federal Union
Surety Co. v. Indiana Lumber & Mfg. Co., 176 Ind. 328, 95 N.E. 1104 (1911);
Falardeau v. Smith, 13 Ohio C.C.R. (n.s.) 268 (1909); a more liberal attitude was
taken in McAuley v. Siscoe, 110 Kans. 804, 205 Pac. 346 (1922) which states: "Mod-
ern ways of doing business and modern inventions necessarily modified the rigidity
of ancient rules of evidence touching correspondence." For cases distinguishing
the letter press see Spottiswood v. Weir, supra note 16; International Harvester
Co. v. Elfstrom, supra note 2.
25 4 WIGNIORE, EvIDENcE §1273.
26 Hosey v. Southport Petroleum Co., 244 Ala. 45, 12 So. 2d 93 (1943);
Olsen v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 299 Iowa 1075, 295 N.W. 833 (1941) ; People v. Wells,
380 I1. 347, 44 N.E.2d 32 (1942) ; for a collection of cases see Annot. 142 A.L.R.
1262 (1942); contra, Leathers v. Salvor Wrecking & Transp. Co., 2 Woods 680
(1875). Most of these cases talk in terms of reliability rather than intent.
27 Because the term "best evidence" has no practical utility many writers
agree the sooner the phrase is abandoned the better. See supra note 4.
28 People v. Wells, supra note 26; Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Mendenhall,
183 Ark. 25, 34 S.W.2d 1078 (1931); Wilson v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 309 Ill. App.
286, 32 N.E.2d 961 (1941); Black Mountain Corp. v. Parsons, 277 Ky. 486, 126
S.W.2d 874 (1939).
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At the inception of the original document rule, there were no
means of reproduction more reliable than hand copying. Consequently,
the -best evidence that could be introduced to carry out the purpose of
the rule was the original writing itself.29 Today this exclusionary rule
should still refuse preference to memory testimony, hand-copies, and
other written evidence which common experience has shown to be less
trustworthy. On the other hand when error, fraud, or imposition are
not to be feared from a reproduced writing there is no reason to demand
production of the original."0 In that case the reproduction is an original.
Although the courts do not rest the duplicate original doctrine
solely on the intent of the parties, they fail to evaluate realistically the
evidentiary quality of certain types of writings. This has resulted in the
illogical situation of preferring carbon copies over photostats or photo-
graphs. The latter processes of reproduction make the writings as
reliable as the original. As long as the photostat or photograph is read-
able, it will bear the same words as the writing from which it was taken.
The reliability of these methods of reproduction has been recognized
in various legislative enactments. 31
The courts must recognize that the best evidence rule gives prefer-
ence to those writings which the parties intend to be originals and those
writings which are as reliable as the original. Either approach should
have upheld the plaintiffs' copy in the present case as admissible without
accounting for the original note. The courts must also begin to evaluate
logically the reliability of each writing introduced into evidence.32 The
rigidity of the existing categories of reliability must be modified if the
best evidence rule is to be properly applied to future cases. Modern day
methods and needs demand the re-evaluation and clarification of this
restrictive rule of evidence.
Joanne Wharton
29 Fear of inaccuracy of a letter press copy was stated by Lord Ellenborough
in Nodin v. Murray, supra note 24, although he did recognize it as more reliable
than a copy taken by successive imitations; Steyner v. Droitwich, Skinner 623,
90 Eng. Rep. 280 (1696) ; see supra note 5.
30 Gus Dattilo Fruits Co. v. Louisville, supra note 8; United States v. Manton,
107 F.2d 834 (2d Cir. 1938).
31 Federal Business Records Act, 49 STAT. 1561 (1932), 28 U.S.C. §1732
(1952). See also UNIFORM BUSINESS RECoRsS As EVIDENcE ACT, 9A U.L.A. 299
(1957) ; OHIO REv. CODE §§2317.40-41 (1953); PHOOGAPMHIC COPIES OF BUSINESS
AND PUBLIC RECORDS As EVIDENCE AcT, 9A U.L.A. 334 (1957, adopted by 32 states.
32 In evaluating this rule the courts should look to the whole process of
judicial proof. See Note, supra note 4; WIGMORE, THE SCIENCE OF JUDICIAL PROOF
§1 (3d ed. 1947) ; Michael, Book Review, 33 COL. L. REv. 770 (1933) ; MCCoRMICK,
EvIDENCE §206 suggests that all mechanically produced copies upon authentication
as accurate reproductions should come in unless the court in its discretion requires
the original. In this context see Priddy-Maer Elevator Co. v. Wenzel, 120 Kan. 423,
243 Pac. 1016 (1926).
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